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The Berkeley Forum Report of 2013 presented a two-
fold vision in which: 1) the percentage of expenditures 
associated with fee-for-service payment would be 
reduced from 78 percent to 50 percent by 2022; and  
2) the percentage of Californians receiving care from  
more integrated care systems would double from 
29 percent to 60 percent by 2022. Accountable Care 
Organizations that are held accountable for both the cost 
and quality of care for a defined population of patients 
were suggested as one means for achieving this Vision.
This Brief has four objectives: 1) to describe the number, 
growth and future projections of ACOs and their 
associated enrolled lives; 2) to present evidence on 
their performance to date and factors associated with 
success; 3) to explore the impact of emerging market 
characteristics; and 4) to review current administrative and 
financial regulation of ACOs as they might affect future 
growth and development. The Brief draws on multiple 
data sources including the Cattaneo and Stroud survey 
of California ACOs; performance data from the Integrated 
Healthcare Association; patient experience data from the 
Pacific Business Group on Health; the UC Berkeley National 
Survey of Physician Organizations; the Dartmouth 
Institute-UC Berkeley National Survey of ACOs; and the 
American Hospital Association’s Annual Hospital Survey.
California has more ACOs (67) than any other state in the 
country with particularly rapid growth over the past two 
years. By February of 2016 over 1.3 million Californians  
Executive Summary
are projected to receive their care from an ACO. The 
growth is projected to occur in all regions of the state. 
All of the largest ACOs are affiliated with either Blue 
Cross (Anthem/Wellpoint) or Blue Shield of California. 
California ACOs tend to provide a greater number of 
services and have more prior experience with payment 
reform than other ACOs across the country. The next few 
years are likely to bring continued growth and diversity in 
accountable care models combining a variety of payment 
approaches but moving increasingly toward full risk-
bearing with expenditure and quality targets.
Using the IHA quality measures based largely on HEDIS, 
the quality of care provided by ACOs is at least as good 
and on some measures better than that provided by 
other medical groups in the state. On patient experience 
measures, the ACOs score significantly higher on all  
six including access to care, coordination of care, 
promoting health, doctor-patient interactions, office staff 
helpfulness, and overall rating of care. While comparative 
total cost of care data were not available for analysis, 
early experience with the Blue Shield, Dignity Health, and 
Hill Physicians group in the Sacramento area revealed 
significant savings for CALPERS employees of $20 million 
(Markovich, 2012). This is consistent with four years of 
experience with performance based contracting in 
Massachusetts (Song et al., 2014). But recent experience 
with the CMS Pioneer and Shared Savings programs 
indicate that approximately as many ACOs have not met 
expenditure targets as those that have.
1: SIZE/SCALE
Most California ACOs are relatively large. Most commercial 
ACOs have at least 10,000 enrolled lives (Cattaneo and 
Stroud, 2014) and many have 25,000 or more. Size is 
needed to achieve the necessary economies of scale and 
also to provide a basis for experimentation and learning. 
At the same time, increased size brings increased costs 
of coordination, which requires informed clinical and 
managerial leadership to manage the pace of change 
within the organization. Smaller practices and those 
serving vulnerable populations in the state will require 
continued investment in electronic health records, new 
care management models, practice redesign and related 
assistance to be successful under the new value-based 
payment models.
Six Key Success Factors for ACOs
2: CARE MANAGEMENT
To keep people well and manage patients with complex 
medical needs efficiently, fundamental changes are 
required in how care is delivered. Data systems that can 
be used to develop predictive analytics to identify the 
high complexity/high cost patients are essential. Based on 
these data, complex care management programs can be 
developed, usually led by nurses or nurse practitioners. 
These include but go beyond care transition programs 
between hospital discharge of patients to home or other 
care settings. It is also important to manage specialist 
referrals to make sure patients see the most cost-effective/
high quality specialists. 
continued on page 4
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3: ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD 
FUNCTIONALIT Y
While almost all ACOs have adopted and implemented 
electronic health records (EHRs), many have not yet 
realized the benefits from EHRs’ full capabilities. These 
include the ability to identify patients who need 
special attention in advance through data aggregation 
capabilities; to group patients with similar needs; to 
exchange data across care settings and teams; to provide 
two-way communication with patients through portals 
as needed; to provide relevant, timely and accurate 
performance data feedback to physicians and other 
members of the health care team; to provide a basis  
for quality improvement; and to provide point of care 
clinical information for physicians, the care team, and 
patients. A robust EHR capability will likely be a key 
differentiator of the more versus less successful ACOs.
4: EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS
Most ACOs include a medical group and hospital, but 
there is considerable variability in the extent to which 
post-acute facilities such as nursing homes, skilled nursing 
facilities, home health agencies, behavioral health or 
community and social service organizations are included. 
Since ACOs are accountable for the entire continuum of 
care for their enrolled or attributed populations, most 
need to develop a number of new relationships with 
organizations with whom they may have had relatively 
little experience in working with before. This will require 
skills in forming effective partnerships with others that 
embrace shared goals, shared knowledge to achieve the 
goals, mutual trust, and accurate, timely, frequent, and 
problem-focused communication.
continued on next page
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5: PATIENT/FAMILY ENGAGEMENT
Nearly all ACOs recognize the need for enhanced 
engagement of patients and families in their care if the 
goals of better care, better health and reduced costs  
are to be achieved. As one person interviewed stated, 
“Unless we come up with engaged patients, we are 
probably not going to be successful. Engaged patients 
[are] a cornerstone of what we are doing.” Efforts must 
extend beyond getting patients to stay within the ACO’s 
network. Greater attention needs to be given to including 
patients in developing treatment plans, shared decision-
making, and involvement in overall practice redesign and 
quality improvement efforts. 
6: MEASUREMENT STANDARDIZATION 
AND TR ANSPARENCY
While larger ACOs have developed the capacity to respond 
to multiple measures of quality, the task remains challenging 
for many others. The IHA Pay for Performance Program 
has been of significant assistance in having providers and 
insurers agree on a common set of measures and, for the 
most part, thresholds for rewarding performance. Future 
consideration should be given to including patient-reported 
outcome (PRO) measures for such conditions as diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, asthma, and orthopedic procedures. 
This will be facilitated by greater use of electronic surveys of 
patients to collect such information. There is also need for 
greater transparency of data and information such as what 
would be provided by a carefully designed and governed  
All Payer Claims Database (APCD).
Based on studies in California and nationwide, six factors 
in addition to physician engagement have been identified 
as likely to be associated with successful ACOs. These  
six – size/scale, care management capability, electronic 
health record functionality, effective partnerships,  
patient/family engagement, and measurement 
standardization and transparency – are highlighted  
below and on the previous pages.
Ongoing market dynamics are likely to affect future  
ACO growth in the state. While greater hospital 
concentration is associated with a lower number of ACO 
enrollees in a county, the largest number of ACOs are in 
counties where the level of hospital concentration  
is below one measure of competition that the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) uses to evaluate the potential  
for anti-competitive behavior. There is a significant 
positive association between HMO market share and  
ACO enrollment. This suggests that ACOs may be a 
competitive response to HMOs and/ or possibly that 
health plans are gaining knowledge and experience  
with the potential of population based payment models 
to generate savings and, as a result, are initiating more 
ACO contractual relationships.
The Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) and  
the Department of Insurance regulate ACOs under  
the auspices of regulating health plans/insurance  
and providers that are already under their purview.  
They regulate ACOs in regard to degree of risk 
undertaken, financial solvency, network adequacy, 
and timely access to care, with DMHC having stronger 
oversight of providers through its Financial Standards 
Solvency Board. While there does not appear to be need 
at this time for additional regulatory oversight, there are 
some other actions the state could undertake to promote 
further growth. Based on experience in other states  
such as New York, Massachusetts, and Texas these  
include; 1) providing enhanced technical assistance, 
particularly for smaller and rural providers and the  
Medi-Cal population, in the areas of electronic 
health records and quality improvement training and 
collaboratives and 2) creation of an All Payer Claims 
Database (APCD) to provide greater transparency of 
information for all stakeholders and to assess performance 
for purposes of learning and continuous improvement.
Creating greater value for California’s healthcare delivery 
system will ultimately depend on the continued growth 
of value-based payment models, which will facilitate 
providing care in lower cost settings using lower cost 
personnel; eliminating current waste and inefficiencies, 
and developing new modalities of care such as through 
patient portals, at home monitoring devices, and retail 
clinics. ACOs have incentives to pursue all such strategies. 
The extent to which they succeed will greatly impact 
achievement of the Forum Vision.
Six Key Success Factors for ACOs (continued)
Executive Summary (continued)
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The Berkeley Forum Report “A New Vision for 
California’s Health Care System” highlighted two major 
recommendations to achieve a high value, more cost-
effective health care system by 2022. The first involves 
reducing the percentage of health care expenditures 
paid by fee-for-service from the current 78 percent to 50 
percent. The second involves doubling the percentage of 
the state’s population receiving care from fully or highly 
integrated care systems from the current 29 percent 
to 60 percent by 2022. One suggestion recommended 
for meeting these objectives was the development of 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). Incorporated into 
the Affordable care Act (ACA) of 2010, ACOs are commonly 
defined as organizations that are held accountable for 
both the cost and quality of care for a defined population 
of patients. There are now approximately 700 ACOs in the 
Introduction: Background and Challenge
U.S, about evenly split between Medicare Pioneer and 
Shared Savings ACOs and private commercial risk-bearing 
contracts between providers and insurers (Muhlestein, 
2014). As of February 2014, California had 67 ACOs, more 
than any other state in the country.
The goals of this Brief are to describe the landscape of 
ACOs in the state in terms of growth, lives covered and 
market share; to examine their performance to date and 
some associated success factors; and highlight some 
key issues and challenges that will need to be addressed 
to achieve the Forum’s Vision of “developing a more 
affordable and cost-effective healthcare system that 
would contribute to improved population health for all 
Californians” (Scheffler et al., 2013).
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California’s soil has been richly cultivated for the 
planting and growth of ACOs. Key developments have 
included the birth of Kaiser-Permanente in the 1930s 
and their subsequent growth; the extensive managed 
care experience of the 1990s; and the emergence 
of approximately 300 medical groups, of which 
approximately 200 have participated for a decade in 
the Integrated Healthcare Association’s (IHA) Pay for 
Performance delegated model based on capitation for 
all professional services delivered and payouts based on 
agreed upon, established quality and cost metrics.  
Thus, unlike most of the country, California medical 
groups’ addition of an ACO contract constitutes a 
relatively minor change from their existing experience.
Given their experience in providing care under such risk-
bearing contracts, it is not surprising that Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs) have proliferated across 
California in recent years (Scheffler, Forthcoming 2015). For 
purposes of this Brief we are defining an ACO as a medical 
group that has a risk-bearing contract to meet both cost 
and quality criteria for either Medicare/Medicaid or a 
commercial plan. From August 2012 to February 2014, the 
number of active ACOs more than doubled, from 26 to 67 
statewide. Although growth has been observed across all 
regions (see Figure 1 and Table 1), the most rapid increase 
was in the Central Valley/Central Coast/North (CVCCN) 
and Los Angeles regions, which each added 13 ACOs over 
approximately 18 months. Together with the Bay Area / 
Sacramento region, these comprise over 80 percent of 
ACOs in the state (Cattaneo & Stroud, 2012-2014). 
The rise in the number of lives covered by an ACO has 
been nearly as dramatic, increasing 78 percent, from 
nearly 514,000 to over 915,000 (Cattaneo & Stroud, 2012-
2014) over the same period. If current trends continue, 
by February 2016, over 1.3 million Californians will be 
covered under an ACO contract, an increase of 48 percent 
from February 2014. Growth in lives covered in the CVCCN 
The Landscape – Rapid Growth
region is projected to be 87 percent over two years, while 
Orange County/San Diego is projected to grow by 12 
percent (see Table 1). 
In February 2014, Medicare and Commercial ACOs covered 
483,000 and 433,000 Californians, respectively. The Bay 
Area / Sacramento region held the greatest number of 
Integrated Healthcare Association Region February 2014 February 2016 2-year Growth
Bay Area / Sacramento  259,525  377,162 45%
Central Valley / Central Coast / North  103,210  192,979 87%
Inland Empire  42,150  53,135 26%
Los Angeles  326,000  525,860 61%
Orange County / San Diego  184,400  206,640 12%
Total  915,285  1,355,776 48%
SOURCE: Authors’ analsyes using linear trend projection from four waves of survey data from Cattaneo & Stroud
Table 1: Projected Growth in ACO Lives by Integrated Healthcare Association Region 
Figure 1:  
Integrated Healthcare Association Regions
Central Valley /  
Central Coast /  
North
Inland Empire
Bay Area /  
Sacramento
Los Angeles
Orange County / 
San Diego
SOURCE: Integrated Healthcare Association
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Figure 2: Lives Covered in Medicare ACOs in California Integrated Healthcare Association Regions
SOURCE: Authors’ analyses using linear trend projection from four waves of survey data from Cattaneo & Stroud
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Figure 3: Lives Covered in Commercial ACOs in California IHA Regions
SOURCE: Authors’ analyses using linear trend projection from four waves of survey data from Cattaneo & Stroud
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Figure 4: Number of ACOs in California IHA Regions
lives in commercial ACOs, 189,000, while Los Angeles led 
the regions in lives in Medicare ACOs, 220,000. Figures 
2 and 3 depict the growth in Medicare and commercial 
ACOs, respectively, across the regions through February 
2014, with projected linear growth to February of 2016. 
By then, over 708,000 Californians are expected to be 
covered under a Medicare ACO and 648,000 under a 
commercial ACO, if current trends continue. The Inland 
Empire is unique in that it has a nearly flat growth curve 
in both Medicare and commercial lives covered. Orange 
County/San Diego experienced an increase in Medicare 
lives but flat growth in commercial lives. 
In California, ACOs are still emerging within Medi-Cal and 
the safety net. As part of California’s “Bridge to Reform” 
Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver, Medi-Cal is authorized 
to test accountable delivery models to improve quality 
and control costs for specific vulnerable populations, 
including children with special healthcare needs that are 
served through California Children’s Services Program 
(Department of Health Care Services, 2010). The program 
currently uses a fee-for-service payment structure, but is 
authorized to test several new payment models, including 
ACOs. The ACO would be developed with a defined set 
of providers that would be accountable for the quality 
and cost of care for a defined population of patients. Of 
the five delivery model reform pilots approved by the 
Department of Health Care Services, two are provider-
based ACOs serving children with special health care 
needs: Rady’s Children Hospital of San Diego County and 
Children’s Hospital of Orange County (Department of 
Health Care Services, 2014). The Department of Health 
Care Services expects to use the upcoming 1115 waiver 
renewal to address several challenges experienced by the 
pilots that resulted in delays, one of which is the extent to 
which providers bear financial risk (Department of Health 
Care Services, 2014).
N
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Tables 2 and 3 (below) depict the five largest Medicare and 
commercial ACOs, respectively, as of February 2014. 
All of the largest commercial ACOs are affiliated with 
either Blue Cross (Anthem/WellPoint) or Blue Shield of 
California. They are present in all five IHA regions and 
range in size from 20,000 to 60,000 covered lives. 
All of the largest Medicare ACOs have some portion 
of their operations in Southern California. The largest 
Medicare ACO, Heritage California ACO for Regal Medical 
Group in Orange County/San Diego, covers 88,000 lives. 
The smallest of the top five, Monarch Healthcare, covers 
Characteristics of the Largest ACOs
Table 2. Largest Commercial ACOs, by covered lives, as of February 2014
ACO Name Health Plan Integrated Healthcare  Association Regions
Date  
Established
Lives Covered  
(Feb. 2014)
HealthCare Partners Associates 
Medical Group, Inc.
Blue Cross ■■ Los Angeles
■■ OC/San Diego
5/1/2010 60,000
Hill Physicians Medical Group/
Dignity
Blue Shield ■■ Bay Area/ Sacramento 1/1/2010 40,000
St. Joseph Health Blue Shield ■■ Los Angeles
■■ OC/San Diego
1/1/2012 32,200
Heritage Provider Network Blue Cross ■■ Central Valley/Central Coast/North
■■ Inland Empire
■■ Los Angeles
■■ OC/San Diego
7/1/2013 21,500
Santé Community Physicians Blue Cross ■■ Central Valley/Central Coast/North 7/1/2013 20,600
SOURCE: Cattaneo and Stroud, 2014. 
Table 3. Largest Medicare ACOs, by covered lives, as of February 2014
ACO Name Health Plan Integrated Healthcare Association Regions
Date  
Established
Lives Covered 
(Feb. 2014)
Heritage California ACO 
for Regal Medical Group
Heritage California ■■ OC/San Diego 1/1/2012 88,000
HCP ACO California, LLC HCP ACO California ■■ Los Angeles
■■ OC/San Diego
1/1/2014 55,000
Sharp Healthcare ACO* Sharp Healthcare ■■ OC/San Diego 1/1/2012 29,800
ApolloMed ACO ApolloMed ACO ■■ Bay Area/Sacramento
■■ Los Angeles
■■ OC/San Diego
7/1/2012 28,700
Monarch Healthcare Monarch Healthcare ■■ Central Valley/ 
Central Coast/North
■■ Inland Empire
■■ Los Angeles
■■ OC/San Diego
1/1/2012 23,000
SOURCE: Cattaneo and Stroud, 2014. 
*No longer participating.
23,000 lives. The Sharp Healthcare ACO, which covered 
nearly 30,000 lives, announced that it dropped out of the 
Pioneer program in the third quarter of 2014 (California 
Healthline, 2014). 
Table 4 (on the next page) compares California ACOs for 
whom complete data are available with ACOs outside of 
California based on a National Survey of ACOs (NSACO, 
Dartmouth-Berkeley, 2014). As shown, the California 
medical groups that have at least one ACO contract 
have twice as many FTE clinicians than medical groups 
outside of California that have at least one ACO contract, 
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provide a greater number of services, and have more prior 
experience with payment reform. While not statistically 
significant, they are also somewhat more likely to be 
physician led and have greater exposure to down-side 
risk than ACOs outside of California. As shown, primary 
care physicians comprise approximately 50 percent of 
physicians in the medical groups with at least one ACO 
contract, whether in or outside of California, which is 
substantially higher than the national ratio of primary 
care to specialist physicians, which is approximately 1 to 3 
(Hing and Hsiao, 2014). This underscores the importance 
of primary care for managing a population of patients 
under risk-bearing value-based payment models.
The next few years will likely bring continued growth  
and diversity in accountable care models. These are likely 
to combine several payment approaches, including:  
1) directly negotiated fee-for-service (FFS) payments to 
providers; 2) care management payments per member 
per month to medical groups or independent physician 
associations (IPAs); and 3) shared savings between the 
ACO and health plan based on a pre-determined spending 
target (Robinson, 2010; Shortell, 2015a). For example, Blue 
Shield of California has initiated approximately 20 risk-
based ACO contracts built largely on Preferred Provider 
Organization (PPO) arrangements with different physician 
organizations and hospitals. In Southern California, 
Anthem/WellPoint recently announced the formation 
of Vivity, a virtually integrated risk-bearing model with 
Cedars-Sinai, Good Samaritan, Huntington Memorial, 
Table 4. Some Comparisons – ACOs in and outside of California
ACO Characteristic California ACOs  (N=15)
Non-California ACOs 
(N=158)
Total FTE clinicians, mean**,^ 609.9 357.8
Percent primary care, mean  49.7 56.1
Number of contracted services (range 0-15), mean** 11.6  8.5
MD performance management (range 0-5), mean§  2.5  2.4
Physician-led, % yes 66.7 50.0
Belong to an Integrated Delivery system (IDS), % Yes § 53.3 47.5
Experience with payment reform (range 0-5)*, mean §  4.1  3.3
Exposure to down-side risk, % yes 46.7 30.2
Perceived local market competition (range 0-5), mean§  4.3  3.8
Multiple ACO contracts, % yes 46.7 42.4
Number of enrolled lives in largest contract, mean^ 20667 22306
* p<0.05, **p<0.01
^ Total FTE clinicians includes the total full-time equivalent physicians in organizations that report belonging to any ACO, while number of 
enrolled lives only refers to the number of lives in the largest ACO contract . Therefore, it is not possible to compute the number of physicians 
per enrolled life with these data .
§For definitions, see Appendix 2
SOURCE: National Survey of Accountable Care Organizations, Dartmouth-Berkeley 2014
Memorial Care, Presbyterian Intercommunity, Torrance, 
and UCLA hospitals/health systems. The arrangement is 
designed to reduce waste and re-admissions, improve 
population health, and share both financial risks and 
gains. The relationships will be based on a common 
EHR system, a 24 hour online “teledoc,” and shared care 
management and wellness programs.
Performance
Given California’s longstanding experience with managed 
care and pay for performance, the question can be raised 
as to what the ACO model adds? To address this question, 
we compared medical groups with an ACO contract 
with medical groups without an ACO contract on widely 
used HEDIS quality of care measures used by IHA for the 
commercial HMO population in their Pay for Performance 
program (see Figures 5A and 5B on the next page). The 
figures show the quality scores for asthma care, cancer 
screening, chlamydia screening, diabetes care, heart 
care, and pediatric care. Figure 5A, which includes scores 
for Kaiser-Permanente as part of the non-ACO group (as 
a closed internally and fully integrated system they are 
unlike the other ACOs in the state), indicates no difference 
between the two groups, with the exception of cancer 
screening for which the ACOs score significantly better. 
However, when Kaiser-Permanente is excluded from 
the analysis altogether, chlamydia screening becomes 
significant and diabetes care and pediatric care nearly so, 
all favoring those with an ACO contract.
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Figure 5A: Mean Quality Scores for California Medical Groups, Including Kaiser Permanente
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Integrated Healthcare Association
Figure 5B: Mean Quality Scores for California Medical Groups, Excluding Kaiser Permanente
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Integrated Healthcare Association
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an ACO scored only 50 points out of 100. While the sample 
of respondents is small, the results are consistent with 
those shown in Figures 5A and 5B and Table 5. Overall, 
the evidence to date suggests that ACOs provide at least 
equivalent and, on a few measures, better quality of care 
than other delivery models in the state and consistently 
achieve slightly better patient experience scores. It is 
important to note that these are cross-sectional data so 
one cannot conclude that the better performance is due 
to having an ACO contract. It is also the case that other 
variables may account for the relationship, including 
characteristics of the medical groups that choose to 
participate in ACO contracts such as their size, ownership, 
prior experience, and prior performance. As such data 
become available for larger numbers of ACOs over time it 
will be possible to conduct such analyses.
In regard to cost savings, the early evidence is also 
encouraging. For example, a virtual ACO-like alliance 
developed by Blue Shield of California working 
collaboratively with Dignity Health System and Hill 
Physicians group achieved savings of $20 million for 
24,000 CALPERS enrollees in the Sacramento area 
(Markovich, 2012; Melnick and Green, 2014). The quality 
and cost findings reported here for California are generally 
consistent with the evidence emerging nationwide  
(Colla, Wennberg, Meara et al., 2012; Pope, Kautter, and 
Leung et al., 2014, Song et al., 2014; and McWilliams et 
al.,2014). For example, the Massachusetts Alternative 
Quality Contract organized by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts, has demonstrated ongoing cost savings 
and improved quality on a consistent basis for over four 
years (Song et al., 2014). At the same time, it is important 
to recognize that the Medicare Pioneer and Shared 
Savings programs have had mixed success. Some ACOs 
have lost money and, whether or not they experienced 
any shared savings to date, have left the program. For 
example, the Sharp Health System ACO in San Diego 
dropped out of the Pioneer program this past year despite 
favorable underlying utilization and quality of care 
performance. This was due to the inability of the Pioneer 
program to take into account San Diego’s significantly 
larger-than-national 8.2 percent area wage index increase 
in calculating shared savings (California Healthline, 2014). 
Sharp will continue their involvement with commercial 
risk-bearing contracts where there is greater flexibility to 
take such considerations into account.
 We also examined the difference between ACOs and 
non-ACOs on six patient experience measures based on 
the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (CAHPS) metrics (see Table 5 below). These  
include timely care and service, coordinating patient 
care, health promotion, communicating with patients, 
satisfaction with office staff, and overall rating of care 
received. As shown, ACOs have small but statistically 
significantly higher satisfaction scores on all six measures, 
and this was true whether or not Kaiser-Permanente was 
included in the analysis.
Table 5. Average scores weighted by the  
group-level response (N) of each measure, 2014 
(Measurement year 2013)
Measure Non-ACO ACO 
Timely Care and Service 54.22% 56.93%*
Coordinating Patient Care 57.34% 59.47%*
Promoting Health 60.00% 61.69%*
Communicating with Patients 76.50% 79.18%*
Office Staff Helpfulness 68.22% 69.63%*
Overall rating of care 62.09% 65.53%*
* ACO score significantly different from non-ACO score at a 99% 
confidence level
See Appendix 4 for further detail on patient satisfaction measures .
SOURCE: California Healthcare Performance Information System Patient 
Assessment Survey
Eighteen of California’s ACOs also had physician 
practices that responded to the 2013 National Survey of 
Physician Organizations, which obtained information 
on a comprehensive, detailed 21-item index of patient-
centered medical home criteria (Wiley, Rittenhouse, 
Shortell et al., 2015b – see Appendix 1). Examples included 
the use of nurse care managers for seriously ill patients, 
the use of reminder systems, performance feedback to 
physicians, use of disease registries, use of electronic 
health records and related items. The five practices who 
indicated that they were part of an ACO scored 79 points 
out of 100, while the 13 practices that were not a part of 
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“No matter how much infrastructure and experience you 
have, do not underestimate the amount of operational 
infrastructure ramp up and cost that is needed.”
 – ACO participant
Based on our knowledge and experience with California 
and our ongoing evaluation of ACO developments 
nationally (Fisher, Shortell, Kreindler et al., 2012;  
Colla et al., 2014; Lewis, Colla, Schoenherr et al., 2014; 
Shortell, McClellan, Ramsay et al., 2014) we have identified 
six factors likely to differentiate those ACOs that will 
succeed in achieving their objectives from those that 
will be less successful or fail. In addition to the obvious 
need to engage physicians, these include size/scale of 
operations; care management capabilities; electronic 
health record functionality; effective partnerships; 
patient/family engagement; and measurement 
standardization and transparency.
Size/Scale
The investment required in electronic health records,  
new care coordination models, practice redesign,  
and related programs is simply too much for small 
practices to undertake. This is why California ACOs are 
relatively large. Most commercial ACOs have at least 
10,000 enrolled lives (Cattaneo and Stroud, 2014)  
and many have 25,000 or more. Size is needed to  
achieve the necessary economies of scale and also to 
provide a basis for experimentation and learning. At 
the same time, increased size brings increased costs 
of coordination, which requires informed clinical and 
managerial leadership to manage the pace of change 
within the organization.
Care Management
Most ACOs have learned that given the new payment 
incentives to keep people well and manage patients with 
complex needs efficiently, some fundamental changes 
are required in how care is delivered. Data systems that 
can be used to develop predictive analytics to identify the 
high complexity/high cost patients are essential. Based on 
these data, complex care management programs can be 
developed, usually led by nurses or nurse practitioners. 
These include but go beyond care transition programs 
between hospital discharge of patients to home or 
other care settings. For example, the Monarch ACO in 
Orange County has developed a high-risk patient care 
management and engagement program hoping to 
reduce the estimated 32 percent of admissions from their 
high complexity/high risk patients that were hospitalized 
Factors Associated With Success
last year. The Palo Alto Medical Foundation has developed 
a program with its Anthem PPO contract that identifies all 
patients with two or more chronic conditions to receive 
targeted management, including asking patients to sign 
a contract for their involvement in the program. The John 
Muir ACO has developed a tool to identify patients at high 
risk for readmission within 30 days. These patients then 
receive a care transition team visit to plan for follow-up 
care. Almost all ACOs in California and nationally have 
developed similar programs. Increased attention is also 
being paid to specialist referral management to make 
sure patients see the most cost-effective/high quality 
specialists. Some ACOs, for example, are publishing 
“preferred specialist directories” for patients to use.
Electronic Health Record 
Functionality
While almost all ACOs have adopted and implemented 
electronic health records (EHRs), many have not yet 
realized the benefits from EHRs’ full capabilities. These 
include the ability to identify patients who need special 
attention in advance (see above) through data aggregation 
capabilities; to group patients with similar needs; to 
exchange data across care settings and teams; to provide 
two-way communication with patients through portals 
as needed; to provide relevant, timely and accurate 
performance data feedback to physicians and other 
members of the health care team; to provide a basis for 
quality improvement; and to provide point of care clinical 
information for physicians, the care team, and patients.  
A robust EHR capability will likely be a key differentiator  
of the more versus less successful ACOs.
Effective Partnerships
Most ACOs include a medical group and hospital, but 
there is considerable variability in the extent to which 
post-acute facilities such as nursing homes, skilled  
nursing facilities, home health agencies, behavioral  
health or community and social service organizations  
are included (Colla et al, 2014). Since ACOs are  
accountable for the entire continuum of care for their 
enrolled or attributed populations, most need to develop 
a number of new relationships with organizations with 
whom they may have had relatively little experience in 
working with before. This will require skills in forming 
effective partnerships with others that embrace shared 
goals, shared knowledge to achieve the goals, mutual 
trust, and accurate, timely, frequent, and problem- 
focused communication (Gittell, 2005; Rundall, Wu, and 
Shortell, 2015).
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Patient/Family Engagement
Nearly all ACOs recognize the need for enhanced 
engagement of patients and families in their care if the 
goals of better care, better health and reduced costs are 
to be achieved. As one person interviewed stated, “Unless 
we come up with engaged patients, we are probably 
not going to be successful. Engaged patients [are] a 
cornerstone of what we are doing.” Two recent national 
surveys have identified the extent of such efforts along 
with some of the challenges involved (American Hospital 
Association, 2015; Shortell, et al, 2015b). These suggest 
that efforts must extend beyond getting patients to stay 
within the ACO’s network. Greater attention needs to 
be given to including patients in developing treatment 
plans, shared decision-making, and involvement in overall 
practice redesign and quality improvement efforts. As 
one ACO respondent stated “We must meet patients 
where they are.” Or, as others have expressed, “Instead 
of starting the conversation with what is the matter with 
you, we need to ask what matters to you?” A number of 
ACOs in the state are moving toward greater face-to-face 
interaction with patients. John Muir, for example, uses 
pharmacists in face-to-face interaction with patients to 
reconcile medications. Several other ACOs are developing 
patient portals for enhanced communication and also 
adding more home visits. Patient involvement in practice 
redesign is also occurring. UCLA, for example, involves 
groups of patients in the re-organization of total clinical 
service lines such as urology and neurology.
Measurement Standardization 
and Transparency
While larger ACOs have developed the capacity to 
respond to multiple different measures of quality, the 
task remains challenging for many others. The IHA Pay for 
Performance Program has been of significant assistance in 
having providers and insurers agree on a common set of 
measures and, for the most part, thresholds for rewarding 
performance. New measures are carefully considered 
and agreed on before adding to the portfolio and, over 
time, measures that are largely achieved, and those that 
become less relevant in the light of new evidence are 
retired. Future consideration should be given to including 
patient-reported outcome (PRO) measures for such 
conditions as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, asthma, 
and orthopedic procedures. This will be facilitated by 
greater use of electronic surveys of patients to collect 
such information. Currently measures are made publicly 
available through the Office of the Patient Advocate. In 
the future, it is likely that they will also be increasingly 
available as part of Covered California’s Insurance 
Exchange. The development of a carefully designed and 
governed All Payer Claims Database (APCD) will assist 
in increasing transparency for all parties interested in 
improving high quality, affordable health care in the state.
Most of the above six factors were evidenced in the 
success of the Blue Shield-Dignity-Hill Physicians Group 
CALPERS initiative previously noted (Markovich, 2012).  
In brief, success was due to a package of reinforcing,  
inter-related innovations. These included integrated 
discharge planning, care transition programs, patient 
engagement strategies, creation of a health information 
exchange, a focus on the 5,000 members generating  
75 percent of expenditures, implementation of evidence-
based variance reduction programs in target hospitals, 
and a visible dashboard of measures to track progress  
that accounted for success.
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Emerging Market Characteristics
The extent to which further growth of ACOs and related 
models may help California achieve the Berkeley Forum 
Vision will also depend on emerging characteristics of 
the California market, evolving regulatory oversight, and 
considerations for promoting further growth.
In this section we examine selective market dynamics 
likely to influence future ACO growth. We look at the 
evidence on the location and growth of ACOs in California  
by exploring the relationship between 1) the number  
and 2) size of HMOs in California counties, 3) the 
concentration of hospitals, and 4) the market share of 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is an indicator of 
the degree of competition among organizations within 
an industry, calculated on a scale from 0 to 10,000, 
with 10,000 representing a single firm with a complete 
monopoly of a market.1 Increases in HHI generally 
indicate a decrease in competition and an increase in 
market power. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses 
a 2,500-point threshold (HHI) as a guideline to indicate a 
highly concentrated market.2 
To determine the market concentration of hospitals 
and HMO market share, we used data from Whaley et 
al. (2015, in press). Data from the American Hospital 
Association’s 2010 Annual Hospital Survey were used to 
calculate county-level hospital HHIs using the number 
of beds in each hospital. HMO share of the market was 
determined from the 2009 HealthLeaders InterStudy 
Survey. For commercial plans, HMO share was defined as 
the proportion of privately insured individuals who were 
enrolled in an HMO. For Medicare, HMO share was defined 
as the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries who were 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage. We also examined the 
number of private and Medicare ACOs in a county. 
We assessed the correlation between ACO number/
enrollment and market concentration using Pearson 
correlation coefficients and fit a trend line using second- 
and third order polynomial regression. Pearson correlation 
coefficients are reported with each result shown in Figures 
6 through 11 (on the following pages).
Key Challenges and Issues Moving Forward
Hospital Concentration and ACO 
Enrollment/Number of ACOs
Figures 6 to 8 (on the following pages) depict the negative 
and statistically significant association between hospital 
market concentration, as measured by hospital bed HHI, 
and the number of ACO enrollees in a county. In 39 of 58 
counties, the HHI is above the 2500-point FTC guideline for 
highly concentrated markets. However, since the counties 
with the largest numbers of enrollees have lower HHI, 
the vast majority of Californians enrolled in an ACO are 
in markets with lower HHIs: 828,000 vs. 87,000 of all ACO 
enrollees, 444,000 vs. 42,000 of Medicare ACO enrollees, 
and 388,000 vs. 45,000 of commercial ACO enrollees.
HMO Market Share and  
ACO Enrollment
Figures 9-11 (on the following pages) depict the significant 
and positive association between HMO market share  
and size of ACO enrollment. This is consistent when 
Medicare and commercial ACOs are examined as a  
group and separately. 
We see that for both Medicare and commercial ACOs, 
the numbers of lives covered and number of ACOs in a 
county are positively correlated with the HMO share of the 
marketplace. Other work (Whaley, et al., 2015, in press) has 
found similar associations after controlling for additional 
variables such as population and physician market 
concentration. Multiple explanations for this observation 
are likely to be true. One is that ACOs are a competitive 
response to HMOs and represent a way for providers who 
are not in an HMO to capture some of the shared savings 
that result from innovative processes of care that reduce 
costs to the providers. But it is also possible that providers 
in concentrated markets are better able to coordinate 
care, so that joining an ACO would not produce additional 
cost savings over coordination already in place. (Frech, et 
al., 2014). Both of these phenomena may be operating in 
California’s markets.
1 The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market share of all the firms within the industry. For example, three competitors with a 30/30/40 split of the market would 
produce an HHI of 3400, or (30*30) + (30*30) + (40*40) = 900 + 900 + 1600.
2 http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html
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Figure 6: Hospital Concentration (2010) and ACO Enrollment (2014) in California Counties
Figure 7: Hospital Concentration (2010) and Medicare ACO Enrollment (2014) in California Counties
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on American Hospital Association’s Annual Hospital Survey and survey data from Cattaneo and Stroud. One outlier of 326,000 
participants not depicted. HHI of 2500 is used by the FTC to indicate highly concentrated markets. Relationship derived from results in paper Whaley et al, 2015.
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on American Hospital Association’s Annual Hospital Survey and survey data from Cattaneo and Stroud. One outlier of 220,300 
enrollees not depicted. HHI of 2500 is used by the FTC to indicate highly concentrated markets. Relationship derived from results in paper Whaley et al, 2015.
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Figure 8: Hospital Concentration (2010) and Commercial ACO Enrollment (2014) in California Counties
Figure 9: HMO Share of Market (2009) and ACO Enrollment (2014) in California Counties
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on American Hospital Association’s Annual Hospital Survey and survey data from Cattaneo and Stroud. One outlier of 105,700 
enrollees not depicted. HHI of 2500 is used by the FTC to indicate highly concentrated markets. Relationship derived from results in paper Whaley et al, 2015. 
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on HealthLeaders-InterStudy survey and survey data from Cattaneo and Stroud. One outlier of 326,000 participants not 
depicted. Relationship derived from results in paper Whaley et al, 2015.
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Figure 10: HMO Share of Medicare Market (2009) and Medicare ACO Enrollment (2014) in  
California Counties
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on HealthLeaders-InterStudy survey and survey data from Cattaneo and Stroud. One outlier of 220,300 enrollees not depicted. 
Relationship derived from results in paper Whaley et al, 2015.
Figure 11: HMO Share of Commercial Market (2009) and Commercial ACO Enrollment (2014) in 
California Counties
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on HealthLeaders-InterStudy survey and survey data from Cattaneo and Stroud. One outlier of 105,700 enrollees not depicted. 
Relationship derived from results in paper Whaley et al, 2015.
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In this section, we discuss how the California Department 
of Managed Health Care (DMHC) and the California 
Department of Insurance (CDI) regulate ACOs, including 
the payers as well as physician organization and hospital 
providers that participate in an ACO arrangement.3 Our 
research is based on reviewing statutes and regulations 
as well as key informant interviews with officials from 
these agencies. In addition, we discuss how California 
and other states are promoting and developing models 
of accountable care, based on state-level information 
collected by the National Academy of State Health 
Policy. In summary, we found DMHC and CDI regulate 
ACOs under existing statutes and regulations, including 
financial solvency and network adequacy requirements. 
Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act, California 
has not enacted a statute nor issued a regulation that 
is specific to ACOs under the auspices of these state 
agencies, likely because current ACO arrangements can 
be regulated under existing regulations. In addition, at 
least 19 states, including California, have established 
statutes, regulations, or programs that are designed 
to promote and develop accountable care, such as 
developing ACO support systems, establishing all payer 
claims databases, and antitrust oversight. We highlight 
New York, Massachusetts, and Texas, because they have 
been particularly active and present important lessons for 
continued California ACO developments.
Financial and Administrative 
Regulation of Accountable Care 
Organizations by the California 
Department of Managed 
Health Care and the California 
Department of Insurance
California has two regulatory agencies that oversee the 
health insurance market. The Department of Managed 
Health Care (DMHC) regulates health care service plans, 
including all Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) 
and some Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), 
totaling 22 million lives (California Health Benefits Review 
Program, 2013). The Knox-Keene Health Service Plan Act 
of 1975 (hereafter “Knox-Keene Act”) and its subsequent 
amendments are the governing statutes that DMHC 
operates under. The California Department of Insurance 
(CDI) regulates health insurance policies, including most 
PPOs and traditional indemnity plans, totaling 4 million 
lives (California Health Benefits Review Program, 2013). 
CDI is led by an elected State Insurance Commissioner. 
Regulation of Accountable Care Organizations
In California, ACOs currently operate within Medicare and 
the commercial market, and are emerging in Medi-Cal 
and the safety net. As of February 2014, 67 ACOs covered 
915,000 lives in the state (Cattaneo & Stroud, 2014). The 
Medicare ACOs are subject to federal regulation and all 
ACOs within the state are subject to state regulation, 
including laws and regulations on financial solvency, 
administration, governance, anti-kickbacks, self-referral, 
corporate practice of medicine, antitrust, and data sharing 
and privacy (Bernstein et al. 2011). 
Table 6 (on the next page) shows that DMHC and CDI 
regulate health care service plans and health insurers, 
respectively. DMHC also regulates its physician 
organization and hospital providers, based on their 
activities and financial risk. The Knox-Keene Act requires 
health care service plans to have a full Knox-Keene Act 
license. A health care service plan is “any person who 
undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care 
services to subscribers or enrollees, or to pay for or to 
reimburse any part of the cost for those services; and is 
compensated on a prepaid or periodic charge paid by 
or on behalf of the subscribers or enrollees” (California 
Health and Safety Code §1345). DMHC ensures full 
Knox-Keene Act licensees have the financial viability and 
administrative capacity to arrange and pay for the care 
provided to their enrollees (California Health and Safety 
Code §1375.1). CDI requires health insurers to obtain 
a certificate of authority, a process that assesses the 
financial viability of the health insurer (California Insurance 
Code §§717-718; California Code of Regulations, §2275, 
Title 10, Chapter 5.)
DMHC regulates physician organization and hospital 
providers through either a restricted Knox-Keene Act 
license or as a risk-bearing organization, based on their 
activities and financial risk. CDI does not have parallel 
requirement to regulate its providers. DMHC requires 
providers to obtain a restricted Knox-Keene Act license if 
they accept downside global risk from health care service 
plans but do not directly market and sell products to 
employers and consumers. DMHC ensures these licensees 
meet its financial solvency and liquidity requirements.
In California’s delegated model, some physician 
organizations not only provide care, but also assume 
full or partial financial risk for the cost of care and take 
responsibility for utilization management and health 
professional credentialing (Scheffler et al. 2013; Ginsburg 
et al. 2009). This results in physician organizations 
accepting capitated payments for professional services 
and sometimes for hospital services as well. Physician 
organizations that do not accept downside global risk,  
3 This portion of the section is based on Fulton et al. (2015), which is in press.
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but receive “capitated or fixed periodic payments” and 
take responsibility for paying claims (e.g., to specialists 
and laboratories) for services covered by the capitated 
or fixed periodic payment they receive, are considered 
to be a risk bearing organization (California Health and 
Safety Code §1375.4). Because of the financial risk this 
situation poses, several physician organizations closed 
due to financial distress in the 1990s (Hammelman et al 
2009). In 1999, California enacted Senate Bill (SB) 260 that 
established the Financial Solvency Standards Board within 
DMHC, by amending the Knox-Keene Act (California 
Health and Safety Code Section 1347.15). SB 260 requires 
physician organizations to submit organizational and 
financial filings to DMHC to ensure they meet solvency 
requirements.4 
Although Knox-Keene Act amendments have not included 
the term “ACO,” an ACO arrangement requires a health 
care service plan to file a “Notice of Material Modification” 
for approval with DMHC, pursuant to the California Health 
and Safety Code Section 1352 (b), if the plan-provider 
financial and administrative relationship has not been 
previously approved. The sharing of global risk between 
the plan and provider would be examined as a part of the 
payer’s and providers’ overall risk portfolio.
In summary, ACO arrangements are regulated by DMHC 
and CDI under existing statutes and laws, as a part of the 
payer’s as well as the physician organization and hospital 
provider’s overall risk portfolio. DMHC and CDI also ensure 
ACOs comply with administrative regulations, such as 
network adequacy for DMHC and timely access to care for 
both DMHC and CDI. 
4 The Department of Managed Health Care currently only regulates physician organizations as risk-bearing organizations, because they generally have a higher share of risk-
based payments and tend to be less capitalized than hospitals. However, health care service plans have a general obligation to ensure that risk-bearing providers, including 
hospitals, have the administrative and financial capacity to meet their contractual obligations (California Code of Regulations, Title 28, §1300.70(b)(2)(H)). The California 
Department of Public Health’s Licensing and Certification Division is the key state agency that regulates health care facilities, such as hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and 
nursing homes. However, the Division’s regulatory focus is on patient safety and quality, not facilities’ financial risk, including the financial risk that a hospital bears within an 
ACO.
State-Level Promotion and 
Development of Accountable  
Care Organizations
The National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP) 
maintains a website that tracks state-level actions that 
are designed to promote and develop accountable 
care (National Academy for State Health Policy, 2014; 
Purington et al., 2011). As of April 2014, 19 states, including 
California, have taken action in at least one of the seven 
accountable care domains defined by NASHP: project 
scope, authority, criteria for participation, governance, 
measurement and evaluation, payment, and support 
for infrastructure. For California, the NASHP highlighted 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) 
pilot ACO with Blue Shield of California (discussed above). 
In this section, we discuss ACO laws and regulations in 
New York, Massachusetts, and Texas – three states that 
have significant activity in this area – as these states 
present important lessons for continued California ACO 
developments. In 2011, New York passed Chapter 59 of 
the Chapter Laws of 2011, a state certification process for 
ACOs that aligns closely with the federal requirements. 
Massachusetts passed its key ACO law in 2012, Chapter 224 
of the Acts of 2012, An Act Improving the Quality of Health 
Care and Reducing Costs through Increased Transparency, 
Efficiency and Innovation. Texas also passed its key ACO 
law in 2011, called Senate Bill 7, which provides a legal 
framework for health care collaboratives, which is Texas’ 
term for ACOs.
Table 6. State Regulation of Health Care Service Plans, Health Insurers and Providers in California
No. Health Care Service Plan / Health Insurer and Provider Activities
California Department  
of Managed Health  
Care Regulation
California  
Department of  
Insurance Regulation
1 Health care service plan or health insurer directly  markets to consumers and employers
Full Knox-Keene Act 
License
Certificate of Authority 
2
Physician organization or hospital provider is exposed  
to global/full risk, but does not directly market to  
consumers and employers
Restricted Knox-Keene 
Act License
N/A
3
Physician organization receives “Capitated or Fixed  
Periodic Payments” and is responsible to pay claims,  
but is not exposed to global risk
Risk Bearing  
Organization
N/A
N/A: Not Applicable
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Department of Managed Health Care and California Department of Insurance statutes and regulations and key informant interviews
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New York has a sophisticated model of support for ACOs, 
whereby the Department of Health provides a range of 
services, including consumer assistance to ACO patients, 
technical assistance to health care providers participating 
in an ACO; and information sharing assistance among 
ACOs (National Academy for State Health Policy, 2014). 
Using this model as a blueprint, California could support 
the further development of ACOs by offering a support 
system that includes information technology, staff 
support, data analysis and feedback, and the convening 
of learning collaboratives. Such support could be targeted 
to areas of the state without accountable care models; 
to smaller groups of providers interested in assuming 
increased accountability under risk-bearing contracts; and, 
in particular to those serving the Medi-Cal population.
All Payers Claims Databases (APCD) are another avenue 
by which California could promote the growth of 
more accountable care by providing more transparent 
information for purposes of assessing ACO performance 
with that of non-ACO providers. As of October 2014, 
18 states have implemented or are implementing All 
Payers Claims Databases to help payers and providers 
make better healthcare decisions (All Payers Database 
Council, 2014). For example, the Massachusetts All-Payer 
Claims Database is maintained by the Center for Health 
Information and Analysis and began releasing data in 
2012 (Massachusetts Center for Health Information and 
Analysis, 2014). New York is currently implementing its  
All Payer Database (New York Department of Health,  
2014). In California, there are three voluntary efforts  
underway to establish claims databases, including 
California Healthcare Performance Information System 
(http://www.chpis.org/), California Integrated Data 
Exchange (https://www.calindex.org/), and the California 
Department of Insurance efforts from a $5.2 million grant 
it received from the Center for Consumer Information & 
Insurance Oversight to collect claims data to be made 
available for analyses. However, these data currently  
do not include cost and pricing information. Senator  
Ed Hernandez has introduced Senate Bill 26 “California  
Health Care Cost and Quality Database” to mandate 
carriers to provide these data (Hernandez, 2014).  
An All Payers Claims Database in California would enable 
comparing the performance of ACOs to other delivery  
and payment models.
While ACOs have the potential to improve quality 
and reduce healthcare costs (Kessell et al, 2015), there 
is a concern that they may foster anti-competitive 
behavior, resulting in higher prices. In Texas, health care 
collaboratives (Texas’ term for an ACO), must be approved 
by the commissioner of insurance, who considers 
whether the pro-competitive benefits of the proposed 
collaborative are likely to outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects of an increase in market power (Greenberg  
Traurig 2011). Prior to certifying the health care 
collaborative, the commissioner must forward the 
application to the Attorney General for approval. 
California has not enacted a similar process, likely 
because at present the state’s 67 ACOs (outside of 
Kaiser-Permanente) cover a small share (2.4%) of 
California’s population, and are located in areas below 
the cut off point for one of the FTCs measures of market 
concentration. Should this change in the future, California 
regulators could engage in dialogue with providers and 
with payers to discuss new payment methods and related 
arrangements that meet desired objectives.
In summary, there is significant state-level activity 
promoting and developing accountable care in the seven 
domains defined by NASHP. The initiatives in New York, 
Massachusetts, and Texas provide helpful lessons for 
California and other states to consider when enacting 
laws and issuing regulations to promote and develop 
accountable care.
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Based on the analysis in this Brief, ACOs offer a promising 
approach for advancing the Forum’s Vision of moving 
away from fee for service (FFS) payments and increasing 
the number of Californians who receive care from 
integrated provider organizations that are rewarded 
for keeping people well. However, the move toward 
capitation and global budget/payment approaches 
requires Knox-Keene financial solvency and oversight, 
which may pose challenges for smaller provider 
organizations in the state (Robinson, 2010). We offer three 
suggestions for addressing this challenge. First, state 
commercial insurers and the state Medi-Cal program, 
working with smaller provider organizations, might 
develop a “glide path” in gradually moving away from 
FFS to capitation and related risk-bearing contracts. 
This will allow provider organizations time to more fully 
develop the capabilities to manage risk; particularly for 
medically complex patients. Second, California insurers 
can use their robust data infrastructure capabilities and 
analytic teams to assist smaller provider organizations 
in managing risk and in developing shared savings and 
related models. Third, the state could consider using 
some of the funds under the 1115 waiver program and 
in continued collaboration with the State’s health care 
foundations to provide necessary infrastructure support 
for those provider organizations interested in serving 
a high percentage of Medi-Cal patients under risk-
bearing accountable care models. Given the overall low 
percentage market penetration of ACOs in the State and 
the market concentration data presented, there appears 
Conclusion – ACOs and Integrated Care
to be little need for any new legislation or regulatory 
action to address potential anti-competitive concerns 
at this time. But this is an issue that warrants ongoing 
assessment and monitoring.
Ultimately, creating greater value in California’s health 
care system will require the continued growth of value-
based payment models, which will provide incentives for 
provider organizations to make significant changes in the 
current model for delivering health care. This will require 
a combination of three actions. First, provide care more 
efficiently and in lower cost settings (e.g. in outpatient 
rather than inpatient settings; at home rather than in the 
hospital); redistributing and delegating tasks to lower cost 
health professionals; and using less expensive inputs such 
as the use of generic versus brand name drugs. Second, 
eliminate steps that do not add value. This involves 
re-engineering the entire value chain of health care 
production. For example, reducing physician office visits 
when available technology makes possible more care and 
communication taking place via email, patient portals and 
in home monitoring devices. Third, add new modalities of 
care in which the benefits outweigh the costs so that net 
value is added. Examples include retail clinics, integrating 
behavioral health providers into primary care practices, 
and early childhood developmental screening and 
follow up. Given increased accountability for both cost 
and quality, ACOs have the incentives to pursue all three 
strategies. The extent to which they succeed will have 
a marked impact on achieving the goals set out by the 
Berkeley Forum leaders.
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APPENDIX 1: Patient-Centered Medical Home Components
Care Coordination/Integration
■■ EMR
■■ Access to medical records
■■ Pharmacy electronic coordination
■■ Chronic disease registries
■■ Nurse care managers for chronic disease
■■ Collect information on race/ethnicity/language
■■ Hospital transitions
■■ Patient tracking
Quality and Safety
■■ Participate in quality improvement
■■ Rapid-cycle quality improvement
■■ Collect data from electronic records
■■ Performance feedback to physicians
■■ Clinical decision support
■■ Patient educators with dedicated time
■■ Patient reminders
■■ Incorporate feedback from physicians
■■ Tobacco cessation
■■ Patient receives office visit summaryAdditional Measures
■■ Personal Provider
■■ Physician Directed Medical Practice
■■ Enhanced access (extended hours, group visits, e-mail)
SOURCE: S.M. Shortell and S. McClellan, et al. “Physician Practices Participating in ACOs: The Emergence of the Unicorn,” Health Serv Res, 2014 Vol 49, Issue 5,  
pp. 1519-1536 
APPENDIX 2: Selected NSACO Survey Questions and Scales
Integrated  
Delivery System
Do you consider you organization to be an integrated delivery system? 
Response options: Yes, No, Don’t Know
Physician  
Performance 
Management
Which of the following approaches are used to manage physician performance in the ACO  
(choose all that apply)? 
Response options: Individual physician performance measures on quality are reported and  
shared among peers within the organization; Individual physician performance measures on cost  
are reported and shared among peers within the organization; Active management through  
one-on-one review and feedback; Individual financial incentives; Individual nonfinancial awards  
or recognition; None
Experience  
with Payment 
Reform
Has the ACO or any of its participating provider organizations participated in any of the following 
payment reform efforts?
Response options: Bundled or episode-based payments; Patient centered medical home (PCMH), 
Pay-for-performance programs,; Publicly report quality measures; Other risk-bearing contracts,  
for example, capitation; Other payment reform effort. 
Responses: ACO, ACO Provider Group, Neither ACO nor Group, Don’t know
Perceived  
Local Market 
Competition
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 equals “not at all competitive” and 5 equals “very competitive,”  
how intense is the competition for patients in your market?
SOURCE: Dartmouth-UC Berkeley National Survey of ACOs, 2012
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APPENDIX 3: Integrated Healthcare Association Quality Measure Summary
H
ea
rt
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age who were discharged alive for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) or percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) from January 1–November 
1 of the year prior to the measurement year, or who had a diagnosis of ischemic vascular disease (IVD) during 
the measurement year (January 1–December 31) and the year prior to measurement year and had a LDL-C 
screening during the measurement year.
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age who were discharged alive for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) or percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) from January 1–November 1 
of the year prior to the measurement year, or who had a diagnosis of ischemic vascular disease (IVD) during the 
measurement year (January 1–December 31) and the year prior to measurement year and had LDL-C controlled 
(<100 mg/dL) during the measurement year.
Ca
nc
er
■■ Women 21 years of age and older who received cervical cancer screening in accordance with evidence-based 
standards.
■■ The percentage of women 50–69 years of age who had a mammogram to screen for breast cancer.
■■ The percentage of adults 50–75 years of age who had appropriate screening for colorectal cancer.
D
ia
be
te
s
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age with diabetes (type 1 and type 2) who received testing for HbA1c
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age with diabetes (type 1 and type 2) whose HbA1c was <8.0%
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age with diabetes (type 1 and type 2) received testing for LDL-C 
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age with diabetes (type 1 and type 2) whose LDL-C Control was <100
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age with diabetes (type 1 and type 2) received testing for 
Nephropathy 
■■ The percentage of patients 18–75 years of age with diabetes (type 1 and type 2) whose blood pressure was 
<140/90
Pe
di
at
ri
c
■■ The percentage of female adolescents 13 years of age who had three doses of human Papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccine by their 13th birthday.
■■ The percentage of enrolled children two years of age who were identified as having completed the following 
antigen series by their second birthday: four diphtheria, tetanus, acellular pertussis (DtaP) vaccinations; three 
polio (IPV) vaccinations; one measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccination; three flu (HiB) vaccinations; three 
hepatitis B (HepB) vaccinations; one chicken pox (VZV) vaccination; and four pneumococcal conjugate (PCV) 
vaccinations 
■■ The percentage of adolescents 13 years of age who had one dose of diphtheria toxoids and acellular pertussis 
vaccine (DtaP) by their 13th birthday.
■■ The percentage of children 2–18 years of age who were diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed an antibiotic and 
received a group A streptococcus (strep) test for the episode.
■■ The percentage of children 3 months–18 years of age who were given a diagnosis of upper respiratory infection 
(URI) and were not dispensed an antibiotic prescription.
A
st
hm
a ■■ The percentage of patients 5–50 years of age who were identified as having persistent asthma and had a ratio 
of controller medications to total asthma medication of 0.50 or greater during the measurement year.
Ch
la
m
yd
ia ■■ The percentage of women 16–24 years of age who were identified as sexually active and who had at least one 
test for chlamydia during the measurement year.
SOURCE: Integrated Healthcare Association, Oakland, California
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APPENDIX 4: Patient Satisfaction Measure Summary
Each question within each composite scored as the percentage of patients who responded with the most positive response 
option (on a scale of ”Always,” Usually,” “Sometimes,” or “Never”).
Measure Questions
Timely Care  
and Service
In the last 12 months:
■■ When you phoned this doctor’s office to get an appointment for care you needed right 
away, how often did you get an appointment as soon as you needed?
■■ When you made an appointment for a check-up or routine care with this doctor,  
how often did you get an appointment as soon as you needed?
■■ When you phoned this doctor’s office during regular office hours, how often did you  
get an answer to your medical question that same day?
■■ When you phoned this doctor’s office after regular office hours, how often did you get  
an answer to your medical question as soon as you needed?
■■ How often did you see this doctor within 15 minutes of your appointment time?  
Wait time includes time spent in the waiting room and exam room.
Coordinating  
Patient Care
In the last 12 months:
■■ How often did this doctor seem informed and up-to-date about the care you got from 
specialists/other doctors?
■■ When this doctor ordered a blood test, x-ray or other test for you, how often did  
someone from this doctor’s office follow up to give you those results?
Promoting  
Health
(The percentage to this rating is a reflection of the percentage of patients who answered “yes” 
to the questions.)
In the last 12 months:
■■ Did you and this doctor talk about a healthy diet and eating habits?
■■ Did you and this doctor talk about the exercise or physical activity that you get?
Communicating  
with Patients
In the last 12 months:
■■ How often did this doctor explain things in a way that was easy to understand?
■■ How often did this doctor listen carefully to you?
■■ How often did this doctor give you easy-to-understand information about these health 
questions of concerns?
■■ How often did this doctor seem to know the important information about your medical 
history?
■■ How often did this doctor show respect for what you had to say?
■■ How often did this doctor spend enough time with you?
Office Staff  
Helpfulness
In the last 12 months:
■■ How often were clerks and receptionists at this doctor’s office as helpful as you thought 
they should be?
■■ How often did clerks and receptionists at this doctor’s office treat you with courtesy  
and respect?
Overall Rating of Care 62.09%
SOURCE: Patient Assessment Survey, Reporting Year 2014. Pacific Business Group on Health
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